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Abstract 
This essay analyses the recent amendment to the Fair Trading Act 1986 that created a 
prohibition of “unsubstantiated representations” in trade. The reform process presented 
an opportunity to bring the FTA in line with recent amendments to the Australian law 
that had addressed the same issues. However, New Zealand opted to go further. This 
essay traces the prohibition through the wider consumer law reform process to 
investigate how the final provision was arrived at. By critically analysing the process that 
led to the amendments, the essay suggests that the decision to create a prohibition was 
based on flawed reasoning. In particular, it is argued that New Zealand should have 
followed the Australian approach, and that creating a prohibition has instead produced 
unnecessary liability in the absence of sufficient justification.      
Key words: Fair Trading Law; Unsubstantiated Representations; s 12A Fair Trading Act 
1986. 
 
I  Introduction 
In 2005, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs commenced a review of New Zealand’s 
consumer protection laws. The review sought to revise, inter alia, the Fair Trading Act 
1986 (the “FTA”) in the light of changes that had occurred in the market place over the 
preceding twenty years. Several problem areas were highlighted. One of the most 
significant was that, due to the cumbersome nature of the existing enforcement 
mechanisms in the Act, it appeared that traders were able to make unsubstantiated claims 
with relatively little fear of prosecution.  
Australia had recently addressed this issue and responded by empowering their 
regulatory agency to issue “substantiation notices”. The Ministry’s review initially 
followed the Australian approach. However, it was eventually abandoned in favour of a 
general prohibition of unsubstantiated representations in trade.  
This essay will track the development of the Ministry’s review in order to 
demonstrate how and why this approach was adopted. In doing so, it will argue that the 
decision favouring a general prohibition was based on flawed reasoning, and that it 
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created unnecessary liability. It will be submitted that aligning the FTA with the 
Australian provisions would have achieved the desired policy outcomes. 
The essay will further argue that the need for a general prohibition was not 
convincingly demonstrated. Accordingly, it will suggest that the real motivation for 
creating a prohibition was to shift the cost of substantiating claims from the Commerce 
Commission onto traders. The essay will conclude that, in the absence of compelling 
evidence to justify this move, the prohibition of unsubstantiated representations therefore 
amounted to an unsubstantiated reform.    
II The FTA, Commerce Commission and Misrepresentations 
New Zealand’s FTA was the implementation of a 1984 election promise to reform 
consumer laws and stamp out insidious trade practices.1 In a trade environment where the 
recent release of the Commerce Act 1986 sought to increase competition, it was thought 
that the FTA would perform a complementary role by protecting the interests of 
consumers.2 Accordingly, it contained a range of general and specific prohibitions of 
misleading and deceptive conduct in trade. 
Section 9 of the FTA reads: 
9 Misleading and deceptive conduct generally 
No person shall, in trade, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is likely 
to mislead or deceive. 
Contravention of s 9 attracts civil liability. The provision is deliberately broad to 
allow a wide variety of misleading conduct to be targeted. The Supreme Court has 
described the section as “directed to promoting fair dealing in trade by proscribing 
conduct which, examined objectively, is deceptive or misleading in the particular 
circumstances.”3  
Sections 10-14 are narrower, and contain prohibitions of specific instances of 
misleading conduct and false or misleading representations. Contravention of those 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1  Lindsay Trotman Misrepresentation and the Fair Trading Act (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 
1988) at 1. 
2   Trotman, above n 1, at 1.  
3   Red Eagle Corporation Ltd v Ellis [2010] NZSC 20 at [28].  
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sections attracts criminal liability, therefore a higher burden of proof rests on the 
prosecuting party. 
Due to the wide scope of s 9, any conduct that contravenes ss 10-14 will also be 
caught by s 9. Indeed, Lindsay Trotman described ss 10-14 as “[containing] no more than 
specific examples of conduct within the wide and general terminology of s 9.”4 A false 
representation, or “misrepresentation”, then, is the paradigm example of misleading or 
deceptive conduct. 
While consumers and corporations can bring private actions under the FTA,5 the 
Commerce Commission is the primary regulatory agency charged with monitoring and 
enforcement of the Act.6 The Commission has authority to bring prosecutions for 
contraventions of the Act,7 and it may also apply to the court for an injunction to restrain 
a person from engaging in conduct that would contravene s 9.8  
A  Misrepresentations 
Prior to the 2014 amendments, if the Commission suspected that a trader had no basis for 
a claim that they had made about goods or services, it would usually have to prove that 
the claim amounted to an actionable misrepresentation.   
A misrepresentation is a statement of past or existing fact that is false. It is to be 
distinguished from a promise to do something in the future that induces entry into a 
contract. It is also to be distinguished from a statement of opinion. However, a statement 
of opinion may, under certain circumstances, amount to an actionable misrepresentation.   
In Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon,9 the plaintiff oil company interviewed Mr 
Mardon, a prospective tenant of a petrol station that Esso had constructed. In the course 
of negotiations, Esso gave Mr Mardon an estimate that the throughput (turnover) of the 
station would reach 200,000 gallons per year. It was found by the trial judge that Mr 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
4    Trotman, above n 1, at 5.  
5    Fair Trading Act 1986, s 41. 
6    Ministry of Consumer Affairs Consumer Law Reform: A Discussion Paper (June 2010) at 12. 
7    Lindsay Trotman and Debra Wilson Fair Trading: Misleading or Deceptive Conduct (LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2006) at [1.8]. 
8   Fair Trading Act 1986, s 41(1)(a). 
9    Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801.  
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Mardon entered into the tenancy agreement with Esso in reliance on that estimate.10 
While the estimate may originally have been accurate, Esso failed to adjust it following 
changes made during construction of the station. It was therefore significantly overstated. 
At the High Court and at the Court of Appeal, Mr Mardon argued that Esso should 
be liable in tort for negligent misrepresentation. The problem that confronted Mr Mardon 
was that the estimate of throughput was not a statement of past or existing fact, but rather 
a statement of opinion or forecast. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held that because 
Esso possessed special skill and knowledge in making such estimates,  the forecast 
carried an implied statement of fact that there were reasonable grounds to believe it was 
accurate.11  
Because Esso had acted negligently, and no such reasonable grounds existed, the 
company was liable for negligent misrepresentation.    
B  Justification 
The justification for prohibiting misrepresentations and misleading or deceptive conduct 
is unexceptionable. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs has stated that:12  
Misleading and deceptive conduct and false representations are regarded by society as 
unjust and unacceptable. Such conduct can lead to detriment for consumers and honest 
businesses, can distort markets, and lead to breaches of contract. This then has the 
impact of reducing confidence in the market and reducing competition, leading to 
associated negative economic impacts. 
So much for misrepresentations. Before turning to the recent amendments, it will be 
helpful to place the above provisions in context by briefly outlining the facts of a 
significant case prosecuted by the Commerce Commission.   
III Probitas Fertiliser – a Case Study 
Mr Ewan Campbell was a lay litigant, a self-professed “kiwi bloke” and, if his 
advertisements were to believed, the inventor of a revolutionary organic fertiliser. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
10    Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Mardon [1975] QB 819 at 824. 
11    Esso, above n 9, at 819. 
12   Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 6, at 27.  
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Mr Campbell operated a lucrative business selling his fertiliser “Probitas” at prices 
ranging from $300-$350 per tonne. The raw natural ingredients that made up the fertiliser 
ran to a cost of approximately $35 per tonne. It was claimed that Probitas activated the 
electrical and magnetic processes in the target soil, thereby “unlocking” nutrients that 
would not otherwise be available.  
Mr Campbell’s happy enterprise hit a snag in 2003 when he approached Mr Sime, a 
dairy farmer, with an interest in purchasing lime and papa clay from him to use in the 
fertiliser. Mr Campbell left a pamphlet extolling the virtues of Probitas with Mr Sime. Mr 
Sime, however, was also a soil tester, and his son, Dr Sime, had a PhD in physical 
chemistry. Mr Sime consulted his son about the validity of the pamphlet’s claims. Dr 
Sime doubted the various claims, and duly contacted the Commerce Commission. An 
investigation was then launched. 
Four years later, the Commerce Commission obtained judgment in the Tauranga 
District Court against Probitas Ltd and Mr Campbell.13 Both the company and Mr 
Campbell personally were found guilty of multiple breaches of the prohibition of false or 
misleading representations in s 13 of the FTA. 
Judge Callander delivered a colourful judgment. The Judge’s preliminary 
observations included a lively passage on fair trading philosophy that is worth 
reproducing:14 
The dualism of good and bad applies to inventors. There are the honest, sincere and 
proper innovators, genuinely trying to advance humankind. Then there are the 
swindlers, snake-oil salesmen, religionists, and pseudo scientists who part the naive 
from their money by scams, confidence schemes, and frauds. As the statesman-
philosopher Edmund Burke observed: "The credulity of dupes is as inexhaustible as 
the invention of knaves". 
Probitas was fined $200,000 and Mr Campbell was fined $60,000. Costs of $12,499 
were also awarded against them. While the case involved a straight-forward application 
of s 13, it was also a useful illustration of the evidential burden that rested on the 
Commerce Commission. To prosecute, the Commission was required to employ one Dr 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
13   Commerce Commission v Probitas Limited and Ewan Malcolm Campbell DC Tauranga CRN: 
05079500275-82, 26 March 2007.     
14   At [2]. 
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Edmeades, a soil scientist, as an expert witness to produce sufficient evidence to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that each of the claims made by the Company and Mr Campbell 
was in fact false or misleading. Mr Campbell did not testify, and produced no evidence 
regarding the scientific validity of his claims. 
The preceding brief sketch of this case will serve as a useful reference point in the 
forthcoming discussion.  
IV Consumer Law Reform – Gaps in the Armoury?  
A  Finding an “initial thread” 
In July 2005, the Ministry of Consumer Affairs released an ‘Initial Think Piece’ outlining 
the scope of a review it was undertaking of New Zealand’s consumer protection laws.15 
The review sought to measure the effectiveness of the redress and enforcement provisions 
in the FTA against desired policy outcomes, and against overseas jurisdictions, in order to 
assess whether the laws ought to be amended. 
In the Initial Think Piece, the Ministry made it clear that the measure of the 
effectiveness of consumer protection laws was the extent to which they achieved key 
policy outcomes. In particular, fair trading legislation must ensure that the reasonable 
expectations of consumers are met.16 
To set the “Think Piece” cogs in motion, the Ministry explained the role of 
consumer protection legislation. By restricting the behaviour of traders, and providing for 
redress and enforcement provisions should those restrictions be disregarded, the goal was 
to create a competitive and fair trading environment wherein consumers could transact 
with confidence. This bedrock justification of the consumer protection legislation would 
persist through the future consumer law reform discussions, and find its way into the 
revised FTA under a brand-new purpose provision.17 
The paper noted that regulatory design must contain penalties and enforcement 
mechanisms that achieve the objects of the legislation. It argued that an effective model 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
15   Ministry of Consumer Affairs Review of the Redress and Enforcement Provisions of Consumer 
Protection Law: Initial Think Piece (July 2005). 
16    At 2. 
17    Fair Trading Act 1986, s 1A. 
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for securing compliance should allow the regulatory agency access to a hierarchy of 
enforcement mechanisms. This hierarchy enables the agency initially to engage methods 
that persuade the trader to comply, while retaining the ability to escalate the sanctions if 
necessary.18   
B  International Comparison 
In May 2006 the Ministry released an “International Comparison Discussion Paper”19 that 
sought to compare New Zealand's consumer protection laws against international 
consumer protection law standards. The motivations were consistent with those stated in 
the Initial Think Piece: fostering consumer confidence and developing competitive and 
fair markets.  
By undertaking the international comparison exercise, the Ministry sought to 
identify consumer protection laws that were not in place in New Zealand, but whose 
inclusion would serve to promote consumer confidence, protect honest businesses, and 
assist the Commerce Commission in its role as New Zealand’s regulatory agency.20 
The paper proposed that amendments to the FTA be considered to provide for a 
number of new enforcement provisions. These provisions would “assist the Commerce 
Commission to act more effectively and efficiently”, “allow [consumers] to transact with 
more confidence” and “enable compliant businesses to compete fairly.”21 Importantly, the 
power to issue “substantiation notices” was included among the provisions.     
The substantiation notice proposal derived from Australian legislation. Pursuant to 
state Fair Trading Acts, regulators had the ability to issue notices requiring traders to 
provide evidence capable of substantiating claims they had made about goods or services. 
The availability of such powers in Australia was influential. This is unsurprising, 
since the development of New Zealand’s consumer protection legislation has largely 
followed Australia’s lead. Much of the Fair Trading Act 1986 was shaped from 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
18    At 4. 
19   Ministry of Consumer Affairs Review of the Redress and Enforcement Provisions of Consumer 
Protection Law: International Comparison Discussion Paper (May 2006).  
20    At 3. 
21    At 4. 
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provisions found in Australia’s Trade Practices Act 1974.22 Furthermore, it was suggested 
that adopting substantiation notices would help promote the Government’s Single 
Economic Market (SEM) agenda.23  
However, there was another compelling reason to make such powers available. The 
paper noted that the FTA lacked a number of “mid-level” enforcement tools. 
Consequently, if the Commerce Commission wished to address a contravention of the 
Act, it had to go to court. The paper observed a claim by the Commission that over the 
preceding three years “the costs of litigation [had] trebled and the number of Fair Trading 
Act cases in the court system [had] doubled.”24  
Thus, another justification for the amendments emerged. In addition to fostering 
consumer confidence and creating an environment wherein honest traders could fairly 
compete, there was a desire to cut costs. As noted above, bringing a claim under the 
existing provisions placed the onus of proof on the Commerce Commission to 
demonstrate that claims made by the trader were in fact false or misleading. In the 
Ministry’s own words: “In such instances, the Commission usually has to go to 
considerable expense and often has to employ significant resources in order to prove that 
such [claims] cannot be substantiated.”25  
Whereas previous discussions led by the Ministry examined consumer protection 
laws in the light of consumer expectations and fair trading practice, this preliminary 
discussion of the adoption of substantiation provisions was couched in the language of 
efficiency. By shifting the onus of proof on to traders to substantiate their claims, the 
Commerce Commission would be spared the initial expense of disproving claims.  
Seemingly as an afterthought, the Ministry stated that “[t]he ability of the 
Commerce Commission to issue substantiation notices should also encourage consumers 
to have greater confidence in the claims that are made about products or services.”26  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
22    Trotman, above n 1, at 2. 
23   The SEM agenda reflects an agreement between New Zealand and Australia to harmonise the 
regulatory requirements between the two countries to enable businesses, consumers and investors to 
conduct trans-Tasman operations. 
24    At 23. 
25    Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 19, at 33. 
26    At 36. 
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Whether or not this cost-cutting attitude is objectionable per se,27 it does go some 
way toward explaining the eventual form the amendments took.  
C  Developments in Australia 
Shortly after the release of the International Comparison Paper, Australia made 
significant progress toward a unified national consumer law. It is helpful to set out briefly 
the Australian substantiation notice approach, as it provides a useful frame of reference 
for the general prohibition.  
In 2008, the Australian Productivity Commission published a review of Australia’s 
Consumer Policy Framework.28 A central aim of the review was to create a single 
national generic consumer law in Australia. 
In the review, the Commission noted that the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC), Australia’s national regulator, had voiced complaints 
about the narrow scope of their information-gathering powers under the relevant fair 
trading legislation.29 The complaints echoed the New Zealand Commerce Commission’s 
own concerns regarding their information-gathering powers, which are discussed below. 
The Productivity Commission noted that changes to the law regarding 
substantiation powers were controversial. The public airing of the ACCC’s concerns had 
inspired strong submissions against empowering the regulatory agency further.30 
Nevertheless, in the end the Commission considered it desirable to bring the 
substantiation powers into the Australian law.31 
Accordingly, when the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) was enacted, it 
empowered the ACCC to issue substantiation notices to persons in trade.32 The period for 
compliance with the notice is 21 days, although an application for an extension of time 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
27    The author expects that regulatory agencies would vigorously defend their right to be frugal. 
28   Australian Government Productivity Commission Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy 
Framework: Productivity Commission Inquiry Report (30 April 2008). 
29   At 243. 
30    At 244. 
31    At 245. 
32    Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 219. 
11 
 
may be made.33 It is an offence to refuse or fail to comply with a notice,34 and an offence 
to provide false or misleading information in response.35 Both offences attract pecuniary 
penalties, with the latter attracting the higher penalty: $27,500 for a body corporate and 
$5,500 for an individual.   
Several factors should be noted here. First, the substantiation notice approach 
brought in by the ACL sought to respond to the ACCC’s concerns about information 
asymmetry vis-à-vis traders, the scope of their information-gathering powers and the 
difficulty of prosecuting misrepresentation actions. Secondly, the substantiation notices 
were considered to be “a preliminary investigative tool that helps the ACCC determine 
whether further investigation is warranted.”36 Thirdly, through the operation of the notice 
process, and with the ability to apply for an extension of time for compliance, traders 
issued with substantiation notices are able to substantiate any claim or representation that 
they have made retrospectively. The focus of the Australian approach therefore appears to 
be primarily on addressing the information asymmetry and providing the ACCC with 
further investigative powers.  
To illustrate the application of this approach, if the facts of the Probitas case arose 
today in Australia, Mr Campbell would be required to produce evidence capable of 
backing up his fertiliser claims. If he did so, the investigation would stop there. However, 
if it was apparent that he had no basis for the claims, the ACCC would still need to decide 
whether to pursue further action under the misrepresentation or misleading conduct 
provisions. The fact that Mr Campbell was unable to point to any evidence capable of 
substantiating his claims may be of some use to the ACCC in bringing those proceedings. 
Crucially, however, the burden of proof would still rest with the ACCC.  
While the New Zealand reforms started off with similar objectives to the Australian 
approach, it will become apparent that they have strayed a long way since. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
33    Section 220(1). 
34    Section 205. 
35    Section 206. 
36    Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 6, at 36. 
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V  Changing Tack – Moving Toward a Prohibition 
A  Consumer Law Reform: a Discussion Paper 
1  The reform proposal 
It will be recalled that the in the last discussion paper, a fiscally motivated Ministry 
proposed that amendments to the FTA should include the power to issue substantiation 
notices. The next discussion paper was released in June 2010.37 At that time the unified 
Australian provisions were brand new, having been brought into effect in April of that 
year.38 The paper ostensibly marked a return to the familiar consumer confidence focus. 
In the Foreword, Hon Heather Roy, Minister of Consumer Affairs, stated:39 
Consumer legislation is an important contributor to consumer confidence and 
successful consumer participation in the market place. Consumers transacting with 
confidence contribute to a productive and innovative economy. For businesses, 
effective consumer laws help to create a competitive business environment where 
reputable suppliers are protected from the inappropriate market conduct of 
competitors. 
After summarising the current state of the fair trading law in New Zealand, the 
paper noted that consumer protection legislation should provide protections against 
“unfair commercial practices”.40 Foreshadowing the direction that the discussion was to 
take, the paper noted that “[making] claims which cannot be substantiated” was an 
example of an unfair commercial practice.41  
The paper also discussed the manner in which fair trading law is enforced:42  
Public enforcement involves punitive sanctions (fines) where there is a perceived 
public harm or an offence rather than individual “private” harms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
37    Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 6. 
38    Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No. 1) 2010 (Cth), s 2. 
39   At 4. 
40    At 19. 
41    At 20. 
42    At 21. 
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There is usually some moral wrongdoing underpinning offences enforceable by 
regulators under consumer laws, and enforcement is technically through the courts’ 
criminal jurisdiction. 
Unsubstantiated representations were then addressed directly, and it is here that the 
pivotal departure in approach was made.  
The paper started out by noting the general importance of ensuring the veracity of 
information that is provided to consumers. This was said to be an especially important 
consideration in the case of “credence goods”, or goods whose utility it is difficult or 
impossible for consumers to ascertain.43 Mr Campbell’s organic fertiliser mentioned 
above is one example of a credence good.  
The discussion paper then noted that the FTA did not allow the Commerce 
Commission to require traders to substantiate their claims.44 The paper also stated that the 
practice of making unsubstantiated claims appeared to be a live issue, particularly in 
identified “growth areas” of the market, such as “eco-friendliness” and “sustainability”.45  
The paper then addressed the question of whether the FTA ought to be amended to 
include substantiation provisions similar to the ACL framework. It was accepted that 
harmonising the law was a logical step toward pursuing the Government’s SEM agenda,46 
but it was argued that adopting substantiation notices would likely be a prima facie 
breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  The argument, according to the 
Ministry, was that substantiation notices reverse the onus of proof, requiring the trader to 
“prove their innocence”. 
One solution to this issue, according to the paper, was to create a general 
prohibition of unsubstantiated representations instead. The paper then offered a draft 
provision:47 
No person shall, in trade, make a material claim in relation to the supply or possible 
supply of goods or services as to the nature, characteristic, or suitability for a purpose 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
43   At 35. 
44    At 35. 
45    At 35. 
46   It will be recalled that harmonising the regulatory requirements between Australia and New Zealand 
was considered to be an important step in facilitating the operation of trans-Tasman markets.   
47    At 37. 
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of those goods or services, without having reasonable grounds to justify or 
substantiate the claim. 
To answer the question “Why a general prohibition?”, the paper argued that it 
would effectively fast track the Commerce Commission’s ability to investigate suspected 
unsubstantiated claims. It was considered that the provision would most often be used “as 
a wake-up call, rather than as a full-blown prosecution”.48 The paper further argued that a 
general prohibition was desirable because there existed a “fundamental premise that 
honest business should only make supported and justified claims.”49 
On the question of penalties, it was argued that the same penalties that apply to 
misrepresentations ought to apply to the new offence.50  
2  Costs and benefits 
The costs and benefits of adopting a prohibition were then assessed. In terms of costs it 
was considered that, first, there would be compliance costs on businesses in forcing them 
to have supporting evidence for their claims; secondly, there may be uncertainty as to 
what constitutes reasonable grounds to substantiate any claim made by a retailer; and 
thirdly, traders might seek to avoid potential liability by not making any claims at all of 
their products.51 This latter cost was downplayed by the Ministry. They considered it to 
be “clear” that traders considered the “benefits of making claims” to outweigh “the costs 
of having to prove [them]”.52  
On the other hand, the claimed benefits were multiple. First, it was argued that a 
prohibition of unsubstantiated representations might have a flow on effect in promoting 
caution among traders and thereby reducing the chances that they will engage in 
misleading or deceptive conduct.53 Secondly, it was argued that such a prohibition would 
protect “vulnerable consumers”, such as the chronically ill who are targeted by bogus 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
48    At 38. 
49    At 38. 
50    At 39. 
51   At 39. 
52    At 40. 
53   At 39. 
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miracle cures.54 Thirdly, it was stated that a strict liability offence for failing to 
substantiate a claim would allow for expedient resolution of any breach.55  
Finally, the Ministry tapped back into familiar justifications for regulating 
deceptive and misleading conduct by arguing that the provision would protect honest 
business and increase the credibility of market places by forcing supporting evidence to 
be provided to consumers.56 
3  An additional paper: substantiation 
Five months later, the Ministry released a further discussion paper dealing specifically 
with the issue of “substantiation”.57 By this point, the legal developments were steered 
firmly toward an outright prohibition, rather than a substantiation notice approach. The 
additional paper nevertheless discussed both. The objective of the paper was to analyse 
the proposed amendments further, within a discussion of the existing fair trading 
legislation.  
The “essential question”, according to the paper was “whether the rights and 
remedies available to the Commerce Commission to enforce the strict liability 
misrepresentation offences under section 13 [were] sufficient to protect consumers and 
other honest traders, or whether additional rights and remedies [were] necessary.”58 In 
short, it was considered that existing provisions were insufficient. However whether that 
answer justified the eventual form of s 12A is an issue that merits close examination.  
The paper noted that submissions received on the previous discussion paper had 
demonstrated widespread support for the adoption of a general prohibition.59 A rather 
simple idea underlined this support: “[It is] dishonest for suppliers and manufacturers to 
sell goods or services if they cannot substantiate the claims they make.”60 This marked a 
subtle shift in the policy of the amendments. It was now considered that making claims 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
54   At 39. 
55   At 39. 
56   At 39. 
57   Ministry of Consumer Affairs Consumer Law Reform Additional Paper: Substantiation (November 
2010). 
58   At 2. 
59    At 3.  
60   Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 57, at 3. 
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without any evidence to back them up was, in itself, inappropriate market behaviour that 
ought to be proscribed. 
B  The End Result – Section 12A 
The general prohibition found its way into the Consumer Law Reform Bill, introduced in 
April 2011 under the Consumer Affairs portfolio. From this Bill, the Fair Trading 
Amendment Act 2013 was eventually carved out. Section 10 inserted the new prohibition 
into Part 1 of the FTA. The result is that New Zealand has created a general prohibition 
of unsubstantiated representations in trade, which came into force on 17 June 2014:61 
12A  Unsubstantiated representations 
(1)  A person must not, in trade, make an unsubstantiated representation. 
(2)  A representation is unsubstantiated if the person making the representation 
does not, when the representation is made, have reasonable grounds for the 
representation, irrespective of whether the representation is false or misleading. 
(3)  This section does not apply to a representation that a reasonable person would 
not expect to be substantiated. 
(4)  In this section and sections 12B to 12D, representation means a representation 
that is made— 
(a) in respect of goods, services, or an interest in land; and 
(b) in connection with— 
(i)  the supply or possible supply of the goods or services; or 
(ii)  the sale or grant or possible sale or grant of the interest in land; or 
(iii)  the promotion by any means of the supply or use of the goods or 
services or the sale or grant of the interest in land. 
12B  Court must have regard to certain matters 
(1)  In proceedings concerning a contravention of section 12A, and in assessing 
whether a person had reasonable grounds for a representation, a court must have 
regard to all of the circumstances, including— 
(a)  the nature of the goods, services, or interest in land in respect of which 
the representation was made: 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
61   Fair Trading Amendment Act 2013, s 2(2). 
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(b)  the nature of the representation (for example, whether it was a 
representation about quality or quantity): 
(c)  any research or other steps taken by or on behalf of the person before the 
person made the representation: 
(d)  the nature and source of any information that the person relied on to make 
the representation: 
(e) the extent to which the person making the representation complied with 
the requirements of any standards, codes, or practices relating to the 
grounds on which such a representation may be made, and the nature of 
those requirements: 
(f)   the actual or potential effects of the representation on any person. 
The prohibition was not significantly different from the Ministry’s initial vision. 
“Representation” carries the same meaning as in the false or misleading representation 
provisions. Contravention attracts maximum penalties of $200,000, in the case of an 
individual, and $600,000, in the case of a body corporate.62  
However, it did receive some sensible revisions along the way. Section 12A(3) is 
designed to provide that “puffery”63 is not caught by the prohibition. Section 12B 
provides for mitigating considerations such as reasonable reliance on existing research,64 
compliance with any existing industry codes of practice,65 and the “potential effects” of 
the representation.66  
The key change in the law brought about by these provisions is that a person in 
trade may now be held liable for making a representation that is eventually proved to be 
true. Section 12A is a strict liability offence, and, in contrast with the Australian 
provisions, there is no room for retrospective application of evidence that might 
substantiate the claim. The best that a defendant can hope for if charged with making an 
unsubstantiated representation that turns out to be true is that the penalty might be 
reduced pursuant to s 12B(1)(f) above.   
                                                                                                                                                                                  
62   Fair Trading Act 1986, s 40(1)(a). 
63    “Whiter than white” and similar hyperbolic marketing claims.  
64    Section 12B(1)(d). 
65    Section 12B(1)(e). 
66    Section 12B(1)(f). 
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Clearly, the extent of liability that was contained in the false or misleading 
representation provisions has been significantly widened by the amendments.  
VI Discussion 
A  The Deficiency of Misrepresentations 
Why did the Ministry consider the existing fair trading provisions to be inadequate? Two 
reasons had thus far been given. 
First, it was argued that it was difficult for the Commerce Commission to take 
positive action against unsubstantiated representations.67 The reasons for this are 
discussed above, but the essential point is that under the existing provisions, whatever the 
level of evidence relied upon by the trader, the Commission must adduce sufficient 
evidence to prove that the claim was in fact false or misleading. A closely related concern 
was that this requirement imposes significant costs on the Commission.  
Secondly, while the Commission has information-gathering powers under s 47G of 
the FTA, it had argued that these powers were insufficient on the basis that the case law 
had given them a restrictive interpretation.68  
The case cited in support of the latter claim was Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission.69 In the Telecom case, the court said that “[the 
Commission] has power to seek information only where it is relevant to the investigation, 
which itself must be one authorised by the Act.”70  
The Commission’s claim that the Telecom case gave the s 47G powers a restrictive 
interpretation is unconvincing. It can hardly be said that it would be difficult to 
demonstrate a degree of relevance between a false or misleading representation 
investigation and a request for documents capable of substantiating the impugned claim. 
If such documents exist, there are no grounds for bringing the charges. Furthermore, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
67   Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 6, at 35; Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 57, at 2.  
68   Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 6, at 37.  
69   Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission [1991] NZAR 155. 
70   At 162. The case concerned the Commission’s powers under s 98 of the Commerce Act 1986, which 
mirrored those found in s 47G of the FTA.  
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the case itself, Gallen J stated that “in an investigative situation and in the context of the 
section, the onus [to show a degree of relevance] must be a very easy one to discharge.”71  
Interestingly, in their submission to the Select Committee on the Consumer Law 
Reform Bill, the Commerce Commission accepted that the powers under s 47G were 
sufficient to request documents capable of substantiating the claim. 72 However they 
argued that if a trader was unable to substantiate the claim, a full investigation would 
nevertheless have to be launched.  
Therefore, the only argument left standing is that it was difficult for the 
Commission to demonstrate that an unsubstantiated representation contravened the 
existing provisions of the FTA.  
It will be recalled from the discussion of the case of Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v 
Mardon above that a claim may, in some circumstances, contain an implied statement of 
fact that there were reasonable grounds to believe it was true. In a submission to the 
Select Committee on the Consumer Law Reform Bill, Meridian Energy cited a line of 
authority that employed reasoning similar to that in Esso, and concluded that “where the 
absence of reasonable grounds is itself misleading, the FTA already applies.”73 Therefore, 
it was argued that the existing provisions were capable of capturing unsubstantiated 
representations. 
Accordingly, the Commission’s real complaint seemed to be that it was too 
expensive to adduce sufficient evidence to establish a contravention of the existing 
provisions. This objection is understandable. The burden of proof that rests on the 
Commission is significant. When the Commission has difficulty ascertaining whether 
there are reasonable grounds for a claim that is made, launching a full investigation must 
seem an unattractive option. However, that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that a prohibition on making unsubstantiated representations was the appropriate 
response.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
71   At 163. 
72   Commerce Commission “Submission on the Consumer Law Reform Bill” at [68].  
73   Meridian Energy Ltd “Meridian’s Submission on the Consumer Law Reform Bill to the Commerce 
Select Committee” at [23].  
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B  Were Substantiation Notices Sufficient? 
The initial intention of the consumer law reform was to adopt the substantiation notice 
approach. As mentioned above, this approach was abandoned in favour of a general 
prohibition. It will be shown that that decision was based on flawed reasoning. However, 
before addressing that issue, it will be argued that a substantiation notice approach was 
capable of satisfying the objectives of the consumer law reform process. 
First, it will be recalled that the substantiation notice powers were enacted in 
Australia in response to concerns expressed by the Australian regulatory agency that 
mirrored those of the Commerce Commission. Australia did not consider it necessary to 
go further and create a general prohibition, and there is nothing in the consumer law 
reform discussion documents to suggest that the Australian approach was ineffective. On 
the contrary, the additional paper on substantiation noted that following the ACL 
enactment, “lawyers [were] advising their clients to hold credible and complete 
information substantiating any claims they make from the time those claims are made.”74 
Secondly, the New Zealand Law Society argued that s 12A would require 
businesses that conduct trans-Tasman operations to comply with more stringent 
regulatory requirements in New Zealand than in Australia.75 As mentioned above, s 12A 
significantly widens the extent of liability. In particular, traders are unable to substantiate 
their claims retrospectively under a prohibition approach.  Consequently, businesses that 
conduct trans-Tasman operations are forced to comply with more strict regulatory 
standards in order to gain access to a smaller market. This seems antithetical to the 
Government’s SEM agenda. By contrast, adopting substantiation notices would have 
harmonised the regulatory requirements and thus promoted the agenda.    
Thirdly, the substantiation notice approach is more consistent with the preliminary 
consumer law reform discussions. It will be recalled that an initial justification for 
adopting substantiation provisions in New Zealand was to address the perceived gap in 
“mid-level” enforcement tools. The Commission was concerned about increasing costs 
and the proliferation of litigation under the FTA.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
74   Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 57, at 9. 
75   New Zealand Law Society “Submission on the Consumer Law Reform Bill” at [29]. 
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Furthermore, the preliminary reform discussions stated that an effective model for 
securing compliance with the legislation should allow the regulatory agency to initially 
engage methods that persuade the trader to comply, while retaining the ability to escalate 
the sanctions if necessary.  
The substantiation notice approach achieves those objectives. By requiring a trader 
to provide substantiating evidence, the Commission would first establish whether the 
claims are valid. If the claims appeared to be unsubstantiated, the Commission could 
persuade the trader to cease making the claims. This would be backed up by the ability to 
initiate proceedings under the existing misleading or deceptive conduct provisions of the 
FTA, should the trader refuse to comply.  
By contrast, a general prohibition approach might be described as a “high-level” 
enforcement tool. Section 12A does not address the perceived gap of mid-level 
enforcement tools, but rather creates a new source of litigation. Accordingly, taking 
action under the provision amounts to “escalating the sanctions” from the beginning. This 
is inconsistent with the “effective model” for securing compliance previously endorsed 
by the Ministry. 
Accordingly, it is argued that adopting a substantiation notice approach would have 
been a logical step in the consumer law reform process, and that going further was 
unnecessary. A similar argument was raised by the Law Society. In their submission to 
the Select Committee, the Society contended that “the scope of [s 12A was] too broad”, 
and recommended that it be “reconsidered, and aligned with the Australian provisions.”76 
C  Why Did New Zealand Go Further? 
It was mentioned briefly above that the initial decision to favour a prohibition was due to 
the impression that a substantiation notice approach would amount to a “reverse onus” in 
breach of the Bill of Rights Act 1990.77 It appears that the fallacy of this argument was 
realised soon after, as the Ministry later accepted that no such issue arose on a 
substantiation notice approach.78 Nevertheless, it is worth addressing the argument for 
two reasons.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
76   New Zealand Law Society, above n 75, at [32]. 
77   Specifically, the right to be presumed innocent in s 25(c). 
78   Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 57, at 13. 
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First, it was this argument that caused the Ministry to “change tack” toward a 
prohibition approach.79 Secondly, it resurfaced in the Ministry’s advice to the Select 
Committee on the Consumer Law Reform Bill.80 The Ministry noted that the Australian 
approach had been considered, but stated that a prohibition was preferable since it 
“[would avoid] the strong reverse onus that … substantiation notices would impose.”81 
The Bill of Rights argument can be dispensed with in short order. Substantiation 
notices are simply a preliminary investigative tool, and the engagement of criminal 
procedure rights is only a live issue once charges have actually been filed.82 Furthermore, 
whatever information is provided in response to a substantiation notice, the onus remains 
on the prosecuting party. They must still demonstrate, to the required standard of proof, 
that the representation was in fact false or misleading. Guilt will not be presumed.  
D  Intrinsic Validity 
It has been argued that the substantiation notice approach would have achieved the 
objectives of the consumer law reform process. It has also been argued that the decision 
to move toward a general prohibition approach was based on flawed reasoning. 
Nevertheless, before a conclusion on the validity of s 12A can be reached, it is necessary 
to assess whether it can be justified on its own merits. 
It will be recalled that the guiding principle for the consumer law reforms was the 
desire to foster consumer confidence. The Ministry asked whether that confidence was 
compromised by the fact that traders could make representations for which they had no 
reasonable grounds.84 It was noted that such conduct was difficult to bring within the 
ambit of the existing misrepresentation provisions, due to the information asymmetry 
issue discussed above.  
The Ministry accepted that two ways of dealing with this issue were to address the 
information imbalance, or to prohibit the behaviour from the outset. Ultimately, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
79   Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 6, at 37. 
80   Ministry of Consumer Affairs Briefing for the Commerce Committee on the Consumer Law Reform 
Bill (27 March 2012). 
81   At [39]. 
82  The opening words of s 25 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 are “[e]verybody who is charged with an 
offence” (emphasis added). 
84   Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 57, at 5.  
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favoured the latter approach, claiming that “[t]he intention of such a provision would be 
to incentivise traders to make sure they can substantiate any claims they make before they 
make the claim.”85 It considered this to be a market behaviour issue, closely tied to 
considerations of consumer confidence.  
While prohibiting the behaviour may well lead to consumer confidence, the 
problem with this argument is that it nevertheless fails to demonstrate necessity. While 
the Ministry criticised substantiation notices as a “limited procedural response”,86 it did 
not explain why a limited response was inadequate. If it is accepted that the substantiation 
notice approach was in fact capable of achieving the objectives of the consumer law 
reform process, it is submitted that going further should have been accompanied by 
compelling justification.  
A recurring criticism levelled at s 12A in the various submissions to the Select 
Committee was that it unnecessarily widened the extent of liability under the FTA. 
Westpac New Zealand argued that:87 
The prohibition provides no additional protection to the public under the FTA as no 
harm can occur from true and accurate representations, and if the representation is 
false or misleading, there is already adequate protection in the FTA to deal with the 
situation. 
Similarly, Meridian Energy considered that the only situation caught by s 12A that 
is not already caught by the FTA was an unsubstantiated representation that turned out to 
be true.88 Meridian stated that they were “unable to understand the policy basis for 
criminalising such claims, particularly considering that they do not harm consumers.”89 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
85   Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 57, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
86   Ministry of Consumer Affairs Regulatory Impact Statement: Consumer Law Reform (July 2010), at 
16. 
87  Westpac New Zealand Ltd “Submission to Commerce Select Committee: Consumer Law Reform 
Bill”, at [5.1]. 
88  Meridian, above n 73, at [23]. 
89  At [24]. 
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Contact Energy also argued that the existing provisions of the FTA were sufficient,90 and 
added that: 
[R]elying on the general prohibition on false or misleading statements to regulate 
unsubstantiated representations is more consistent with the Government’s stated 
commitment of introducing “new regulation only when [it] is satisfied that it is 
required, reasonable, and robust”. 
The Select Committee report on the Bill argued that:91 
No direct harm may necessarily occur from representations that are true but 
nonetheless unsubstantiated, but there can be indirect harm. Traders who incur the 
costs of undertaking relevant research before making claims are disadvantaged relative 
to traders willing to make unsubstantiated claims. There can also be indirect harm to 
consumers, such as paying a premium for goods when additional benefits are not 
substantiated, or buying goods in the expectation they will deliver particular outcomes 
that are not substantiated.  
It may be true that traders who undertake research to verify their claims are 
disadvantaged relative to unscrupulous traders. However, it is questionable whether this 
alone justifies extending liability, and the significant consequent penalties, to situations 
where it is proved that no direct harm has occurred.  
Furthermore, it was not shown that the substantiation notice approach was 
inadequate to address the “indirect harm”. Traders who do undertake research would not 
be disadvantaged under a substantiation notice framework because they would be able to 
respond quickly to any substantiation notice served on them, whereas unscrupulous 
traders would not. Accordingly, in the absence of an explanation as to why the 
substantiation notice approach was insufficient and why a prohibition was necessary, 
there is a very real risk that s 12A amounts to “regulatory overreach”.92   
Having arrived at that conclusion, it is difficult to resist the inference that the 
primary motivation for s 12A was to shift the onus of proving the validity of claims from 
the Commerce Commission onto the defendant. Although the Ministry argued that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
90  Contact Energy Ltd “Consumer Law Reform Bill: Submission to Commerce Committee” at [2.1]. 
91  Consumer Law Reform Bill 2011 (287-2) (select committee report) at 3.  
92  Meridian, above n 73, at [24]. 
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prohibition approach does not technically amount to a reverse onus,93 in practice it will 
come very close. 
Thus, suppose once more that the facts of Probitas arose today, and that the 
Commission launched an investigation against Mr Campbell under s 12A. Pursuant to the 
information-gathering powers under s 47G, the Commission could effectively require him 
to substantiate his extravagant fertiliser claims. When it was apparent that he could not, 
proceedings would presumably issue. However, as a result of the enactment of s 12A, all 
the Commission would need to prove is that Mr Campbell had no reasonable grounds for 
the various claims he had made.  
Given that the extent of the evidence adduced by Mr Campbell at trial was the 
testimony of his “Southland agent” as to the performance of his own farm,94 the 
evidential hurdle confronting the Commission would be considerably lower. Indeed, apart 
from pointing to the fact that Mr Campbell was unable to provide any evidence in 
response to the s 47G notice, it is difficult to imagine what more the Commission would 
actually need to prove in order to successfully bring the charge. 
VII Conclusion 
The Ministry’s review of New Zealand’s consumer protection laws highlighted the 
problem that it was difficult for the Commerce Commission to bring unsubstantiated 
representations within the scope of the existing FTA provisions. Two reasons for this 
emerged. First, an information asymmetry issue existed between traders and the 
Commission. Secondly, bringing proceedings under the misrepresentation provisions 
imposed significant costs on the Commission. 
The Ministry initially argued for an amendment to the FTA that would allow the 
Commerce Commission to issue substantiation notices. This was the approach taken by 
Australia in response to similar concerns voiced by their own regulatory agency. This 
approach would have addressed the information asymmetry issue, and would have 
coincided with the underlying objectives of the consumer law reform process. 
Instead, New Zealand opted to create a general prohibition. Initially, this was based 
on the misconception that a substantiation notice approach would breach the Bill of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
93  Ministry of Consumer Affairs, above n 57, at 12. 
94  Probitas, above n 13, at [92].  
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Rights Act. However, by the time the fallacy of that argument was realised the reforms 
were steered firmly toward a general prohibition. 
The failure to demonstrate the deficiency of alternative approaches allowed the 
inference to be drawn that the real motivation for creating a prohibition was to shift the 
cost of substantiating claims from the Commerce Commission onto traders. Since s 12A 
significantly widened the previous limits of liability under the FTA without a convincing 
justification for doing so, it is concluded that the amendment was an unsubstantiated 
reform. 
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